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Abstract: In 1906, a German physician, Dr. Alois Alzheimer, specifically identified a 
collection of brain cell abnormalities (and the formation of plaque in the brain) as a 
disease, which forever changed the way scientists view degenerative cognitive disorders. 
Today, this brain disease bears his name, and is one of the most common diseases among 
the aging population. The discovery of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) can be seen as a 
revolutionary, paradigmatic shift in regards to scientific discovery from a Kuhnian 
perspective. In that vein, the discovery presents philosophical implications for the notion 
of personhood and how those suffering from AD are treated in society.  
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I. Introduction of the Topic 
 
 When considering the history of scientific development, one often thinks of 
groundbreaking discoveries such as the polio vaccination, the double-helix structure of 
DNA, and the Human Genome Project. To that effect, we often overlook the 
revolutionary discovery of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), perhaps taking for granted the 
prominence of mental illness in society and the aging population. Progressive mental 
deterioration in old age has been documented throughout history. However, it was not 
until 1906 that a German physician, Dr. Alois Alzheimer, specifically identified a 
collection of brain cell abnormalities (and the formation of plaque in the brain) as a 
disease. Today, this degenerative brain disorder bears his name, and is one of the most 
common diseases among the aging population. Since its discovery 107 years ago, there 
have been various scientific breakthroughs in AD research, pushing the boundaries of the 
AD paradigm.  
Dementia, the medical condition that often progresses to AD, was addressed in 
the 18th and 19th centuries; however, it was often associated with “general paralysis,” 
“madness” and “hysteria” (Berrios 1) – general terms used to define a broad array of 
mental illness symptoms. It was solely because of Dr. Alzheimer, and his discovery of 
this particular advanced-stage mental deterioration, that led to its differentiation from 
other types of mental illness. More importantly, individuals must ask themselves about 
the impact scientific development has on their conceptions of reality – and in this case – 
the philosophical impact of the discovery of AD.  
To support the philosophical significance of scientific paradigm shifts and 
personhood, I will use Thomas Kuhn’s methodology of philosophical analysis. A 
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paradigm shift (or revolutionary science) is, according to Kuhn in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, a change in the basic assumptions, or paradigms, within the ruling 
theory of science, which is in contrast to his notion of normal science where scientists 
problem-solve within a paradigm.  The periodic change in science causes individuals to 
rethink personhood – that is, the status of being a person in a given environment. For 
example, Kuhn in The Copernican Revolution writes about how the changing 
understanding of the sun-centered universe from medieval to modern Western society 
seemed to affect man’s relation to the universe and to God… it was “therefore also a part 
of the transition in Western man’s sense of values” (2). The same is true for those in the 
early 20th century who were living during the discovery of AD.    
Without an examination of scientific paradigm shifts, it is difficult to comprehend 
the impact of science on the external world. Without such shifts, scientific advancement 
does not occur. However, it is because of them that acceptable and valid science is 
questioned within the professional community. As science keeps evolving, it is difficult 
for individuals to pinpoint an explanation for how the world works and how they can 
define themselves within it. For those who are not cognitively impaired, defining their 
sense of reality within the realm of altering science is difficult. For those who are 
experiencing mental deterioration, their ability to perceive the world is biologically 
altered and nearly impossible. Concurrently, the scientific understanding of the world 
around them continues to evolve. For these individuals, the notion of personhood is an 
abstract idea because it can never be fully explored in a world of paradigm shifts and 
mental deterioration. Therefore, Dr. Alzheimer’s discovery of AD served as a paradigm 
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for other diseases, while simultaneously raising philosophical questions concerning the 
definition of personhood.    
II. History of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) 
 
 Dr. Alois Alzheimer was born on June 14, 1864 in Markbreit, Germany, and 
studied medicine at the top universities in Germany. By 1888, he was promoted to senior 
physician (Maurer 1546). Since its discovery 107 years ago, dementia of the Alzheimer’s 
type (as it is formerly known) is considered to be one of the most devastating diseases of 
old age. Despite intensive research about the illness, the disease still remains elusive 
(Zilka 343). However, the advances of Alois Alzheimer are revolutionary because the 
concept of psychosis “dates only from the late 19th century. It was formed out of the 
remnants of three ancient categories: insanity, alienation, and dementia” (Berrios 1). 
During the first half of the 19th century, epilepsy and other insanities were considered 
neurotic disorders. “Under the influence of factors such as the decline of the 18th century 
Cullean concept of neurosis, the development of the new descriptive psychopathology, 
the introduction of statistics, and the availability of longitudinal observations of 
hospitalized cohorts,” mental illness was redefined (Berrios 1). Before the discovery of 
AD, general paralysis was the most common diagnosis of patients with depression who 
went on to develop dementia, and by 1883, there was awareness that this severe affective 
disorder created cognitive impairment (Berrios 393).  
 “Alzheimer made fundamental contributions to understanding other diseases such 
as vascular dementia, Huntington’s chorea, syphilis, brain tumors, and epilepsy,” (Zilka 
345). His many years of research “serve as the foundation for today’s extensive search 
for a cure of the disease that bears his name” (Zilka 345). The markings of his 
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revolutionary research began in 1906, at the 37th meeting of Southwest German 
Psychiatrists in Tübingen. Alzheimer presented his clinical and neuropathological 
findings on Augusta D, a 51-year-old woman, who suffered from an unusual disease of 
the cerebral cortex, which caused memory loss and disorientation, followed by 
depressions and hallucinations (Zilka 344). He recorded his findings in a short abstract 
and presented it at the 37th meeting. He reported at the conference, “the pathological 
examination revealed atrophy and specific lesions, which he described as a ‘paucity of 
cells in the cerebral cortex and clumps of filaments between nerve cells’ (eine eigenartige 
Erkrankung der Hirnrinde, as it is known in German),” (Zilka 344). These results were 
declared, after further research, to be the “first images of plaque and neurofibrillary 
tangles” in Augusta D.’s brain (Karolinksa Institutet 1).  
 On November 25th, 1901, a 51-year-old woman named Augusta (sometimes 
spelled as Auguste) Deter was sent to the Frankfurt Hospital, where Alzheimer worked. 
She had the symptoms of the legal definition of dementia, which included impaired 
memory, aphasia, disorientation, and psychosocial incompetence. Her condition became 
more severe, and she began to lose her cognitive functions and to experience 
hallucinations (Maurer 1546). “Because of her age, Deter was diagnosed with presenile 
dementia; today, the diagnosis would be early-onset AD, which is defined as 
development of the condition before the age of 65” (Maurer 1547).  At age 55, Deter 
died, and by this time, Alzheimer had left Frankfurt and was working under Emil 
Kraepelin at the Royal Psychiatric Clinic in Munich. Upon her death, Alzheimer 
requested that her medical records be sent to him (Maurer 1548). In 1995, Dr. Maurer and 
his colleagues rediscovered the file (Maurer 1548).  
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 Alzheimer, in those files, concluded that Deter “had no sense of time or place. 
She could barely remember details of her life and frequently gave answers that had 
nothing to do with the questions and were incoherent. Her moods changed rapidly” 
(Maurer 1547). She seemed to be consciously aware of her helplessness. Alzheimer 
called it the “Disease of Forgetfulness” (Maurer 1548). For example, around midday 
during one afternoon of evaluation, Deter ate pork and cauliflower. Alzheimer 
interviewed her as she ate; Deter’s responses are in italics in this excerpt from the 
medical file dated November 26, 1901:  
“What are you eating? Spinach (she was chewing meat). What are you 
eating now? “First, I eat potatoes and then horseradish. Write a 5. She 
writes, ‘A woman.’ Write an 8. She writes, Augusta (while she is writing 
she again says, It’s like I have lost myself) (Maurer 1548).  
 
On November 29, 1901, on the same page, Maurer reprints this excerpt of Alzheimer’s 
file:  
If you buy six eggs, at 7 dimes each, how much is it? Differently. On what 
street do you live? I can tell you. I must wait a bit. What did I ask you? 
Well, this is Frankfurt or Main. One what street do you live? 
Waldmarstreet, not, no…When did you marry? I don’t know at present. 
The woman lives on the same floor. Which woman? The woman where we 
are living…I show her a key, a pencil, and a book, and she names them 
correctly. What did I show you? I don’t know. I don’t know. It’s difficult, 
isn’t it? So anxious, so anxious. I show her three fingers; how many 
fingers? Three. Are you still anxious. Yes. How many fingers did I show 
you? Frankfurt or Main.  
 
Five years after her evaluation, she died. Alzheimer requested that her medical files be 
sent to him for further evaluation.  
 When Alzheimer examined the reports of her brain and the autopsy, he found that 
in the later years of her illness, her condition had deteriorated considerably. He noted 
previously that he had seen this type of degenerative condition in other patients, but this 
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was the first one who had experienced these symptoms at such a young age. Her death 
was the result of sepsis caused by an infected bedsore. On examining her brain, he found 
senile plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (Maurer 1548). Alzheimer anticipated the 
debate about which type of dementia Deter may have had by his remark in the 1907, “a 
histopathological analysis of a later point will show the peculiarity of this case” (Maurer 
1549). In 1910, the disease was named after Alzheimer when his superior Emil Kraepelin 
found the description of this disease in a textbook (Karolinksa Institutet 1). More than a 
century later, her case was re-examined with modern medical technology, where 
scientists found a genetic cause for her disease. Maurer published the results, and 
according to it, “a mutation in the PSEN1 gene was found, which alters the function of 
gamma secretase, and is a known cause of young onset AD” (Maurer 1549).  
 Since then, there have been several breakthroughs in science regarding the 
particulars of AD. The Karolinksa Institutet annotated the following timeline. In 1976, 
the deficiency of the acetylcholine (ACH) neurotransmitter was linked to AD, paving the 
way for the drugs in use today to slow of the progression of the disease. In 1984, Glenner 
and Wong identified the presence of the beta-amyloid protein in the plaque developed in 
the brain. In 1986, the tau protein was discovered in the development of the 
neurofibrillary tangles. In 1992, mutations of the gene that codes for the protein deposited 
in the plaque were identified. In 1993, a mutation in the apoplipoprotein E gene was 
linked to AD, while the first AD drug to inhibit the production of ACH was registered in 
the United States.  In 2002, the new form of the NMDA receptor blocker was registered 
(1).  Most recently, in 2012, researchers discovered the gene TREM2’s potential 
metabolic pathway in the production of toxic shards of a protein that accumulates in 
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plaques on the brain. TREM2 is only the second gene discovered to increase the risk of 
AD substantially in older persons (Guerriero 1). These developments are single-handedly 
associated with Alzheimer’s discovery, because his revolutionary research was the 
cornerstone for all of the following scientific investigations.  
III. A Kuhnian Analysis: The Significance of Paradigm Shifts 
A mature science, according to Kuhn, experiences alternating phases of normal 
science and revolutions. In normal science, the key theories, instruments, values, and 
metaphysical assumptions that comprise the disciplinary matrix are kept fixed, allowing 
for the generation of solutions, whereas in a scientific revolution the disciplinary matrix 
undergoes revision, in order to permit the solution of the anomalous puzzles that 
disturbed the preceding period of normal science. Kuhn sees multiple revolutions in the 
history of science; that is, multiple cases of the overthrow of one scientific paradigm by 
another. The discovery of AD is a clear example of this, both historically and 
philosophically. As evident above, the discovery of AD is distinctly paradigmatic, and 
Kuhn would agree.  
In order to apply a Kuhnian analysis to this scientifically historical event, one has 
to accept his assumptions (one’s elaborated on through out The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions): that scientific fields undergo periodic paradigm shifts rather than solely 
progressing in a linear and continuous way; that these paradigm shifts open up new 
approaches to understanding what scientists would never have considered valid before; 
and that the notion of scientific truth, at any given moment, cannot be established solely 
by objective criteria but is defined by a consensus of a scientific community. Competing 
paradigms are frequently incommensurable, that is, they are competing accounts of 
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reality, which cannot be coherently reconciled. Thus, one’s comprehension of science can 
never attain full objectivity.  
A particularly important part of Kuhn’s thesis in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions focuses upon one specific component of the disciplinary matrix. This is the 
consensus on exemplary instances of scientific research. The central idea of this book is 
that the development of science is driven, in normal periods of science, by adherence to 
what Kuhn calls a “paradigm.”  He cites Aristotle’s analysis of motion, Ptolemy’s 
computations of planetary positions, Lavoisier’s application of the balance, and 
Maxwell’s mathematization of the electromagnetic field as paradigms (Kuhn 23). The 
functions of a paradigm are to supply puzzles for scientists to solve and to provide the 
tools for their solution (Kuhn 35). A crisis in science arises when confidence is lost in the 
ability of the paradigm to solve particularly worrying puzzles called “anomalies” (Kuhn 
52). Crisis is followed by a scientific revolution if a rival supersedes the existing 
paradigm. Kuhn claimed that science guided by one paradigm would be 
“incommensurable” with science developed under a different paradigm, by which he 
meant that there is no common measure for assessing the different scientific theories 
(Kuhn 145-148). This thesis of incommensurability does not allow for a theory of normal 
science, consequently rejecting some traditional views of scientific development, such as 
the view that later science builds on the knowledge contained within earlier theories, or 
the view that later theories are closer approximations to the truth than earlier theories. 
He adds that “normal science is cumulative and it owes its success to the ability of 
scientists regularly to select problems that can be solved with conceptual and 
instrumental techniques close to those already in existence” (Kuhn 96). Although it is 
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intuitive to say that science contains some level of accumulation, Kuhn holds that such is 
incommensurable throughout his writings, and then, later revises his thesis to allow for a 
cumulative process. Although many would view this theory as inconsistent, in the case of 
AD, the problem of accumulation is irrelevant because the discovery of AD was the first 
of its kind. The subsequent developments following the initial discovery could be more 
thoroughly analyzed in regards to incommensurability. Dr. Alzhiemer’s work, however, 
was not only revolutionary then, but also original.  
For example, Aristotelians said that a stone fell because its “nature” drove it 
toward the center of the universe (Kuhn 104). Kuhn devoted The Copernican Revolution 
to exploring the history of scientific development to further support his philosophy of 
paradigmatic shifts. Kuhn’s analysis of the Copernican paradigm shift emphasized that, 
in its beginning, it did not offer more accurate predictions of celestial events, such as 
planetary positions, than the Ptolemaic system, but instead appealed to some practitioners 
based on a promise of better, simpler, solutions that might be developed at some point in 
the future. Kuhn called the core concepts of an ascendant revolution its paradigms. Kuhn 
writes, “Copernicus’ innovation first destroyed that traditional explanation of planetary 
motion and then, as modified by Kepler, suggested a radically new approach to celestial 
physics,” (Kuhn 245). Dr. Alzheimer’s discoveries overturned previously accepted views 
of degenerative cognitive disorders, which were clumped together as neurotic disorders, 
such as epilepsy and insanity (Berrios 1). By extension, Dr. Alzheimer’s work can be 
viewed as paradigmatic.  
 He writes, “The new paradigm, or a sufficient hint to permit later articulation, 
emerges all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man deeply 
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immersed in crisis” (Kuhn 89). In this sense, paradigm shifts are almost spontaneous and 
not directly affiliated with normal science. Scientific revolutions are then “non-
cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in 
part by an incompatible new one” (Kuhn 92). Moreover, Kuhn claims that paradigm 
shifts in science are equivalent to the transition of politics within a community. “As in 
political revolutions, so in paradigm choice there is no standard higher than the assent of 
the relevant community” (Kuhn 93). Kuhn’s hunch is that scientific change brings about 
a change in the entities that are taken to be primitive and unexplained. These concepts 
hold when applied to AD.  
 In 1910, Emil Kraepelin in his influential, Psychiatrae: Ein Lehrbuch für 
Studierende and Aerzte, stated, “The clinical interpretation of this AD is still unclear. 
Although the anatomical findings suggest that we are dealing with a particularly serious 
form of senile dementia. However, the fact is that this disease sometimes starts as early as 
in the late forties” (Zilka 344). It is because of the age of onset that researchers 
determined that this disease was something newly discovered, and it became a significant 
in the development of this new brain disease. “Relatively rare AD was separated from 
senile dementia and accepted as a diagnostic category. This classification remained intact 
until the last third of the 20th century” (Zilka 345). It is evident, then, that AD created a 
new paradigm in regards to psychiatry and degenerative cognitive disorders. However, as 
Kuhn also argues in his writings, scientific progress is not purely objective. “Some 
authors claim that Kraepelin’s decision to separate a pre-senile form of dementia from 
senile dementia and to put the name of AD for the former one was most probably inspired 
by political reasons rather than by exact scientific data” (Zilka 345). Here, the problem of 
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trying to balance subjective goals with scientific fact is a realistic struggle.  
As far as the main conclusion of Kuhn’s theory is concerned, Kuhn’s argument is 
convincing. There is no doubt that the worldview that emerges from a scientific 
revolution may be incommensurable, but it is so in a weak sense. That is, new terms 
describing the new revolution may not be straightforwardly comparable to the “old 
science,” and the new paradigm leads to at least some incompatible predictions when 
compared to the scientific theory it replaced. The same holds true for AD – the minute 
details separating pre-senile and senile dementia are still relatively unclear today, 107 
years after the discovery of AD. After reading The Copernican Revolution, it is clear that 
most paradigmatic shifts are the results of centuries of scientific research. The history of 
scientific development is a long one. The major incongruity within Kuhn’s theory raises 
the question: If many paradigms do not change in a sudden way, how are they not built 
on prior knowledge? There is often a foundation supporting paradigm shifts in order to 
allow it to occur. For example, the paradigm shifts concerning planetary motion came out 
of centuries of scientific research. After reflecting on the prompt, it is clear that Kuhn 
comes from two different vantage points.  
At one point, Kuhn claims, at least, that scientific advancement is historically 
aggregated. In some cases this theory is true, but it does not completely explain the 
“eureka” moments of scientific discovery or the scientific discoveries that happen 
accidentally or spontaneously. The field of psychiatry is aggregated, but the discovery of 
AD is an equivalent to these eureka moments of scientific discovery. In order to revise 
this, Kuhn contradicts himself by first claiming that science usually “does not aim at 
novelties of fact or theory,” but then goes on to say that “history even suggests that the 
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powerful scientific enterprise has developed a uniquely powerful technique for producing 
surprises” (52). Kuhn does not elaborate on this method for producing “surprises;” he 
asserts that it exists to account for the fact that his philosophy demands that the usual 
course of science produces both slow progress and rapid change. 
When Kuhn later writes that science is not cumulative, he means that the 
scientific revolution replacing “normal science” is one separate and distinct from, in a 
strict sense, the outdated science. However, with this logic, he neglects that many 
scientific revolutions come out of an older paradigm wherein the scientific revolution 
often begins as a revision to old scientific standards. Ultimately, the lesson that one could 
draw from this analysis is that paradigmatic shifts are necessary in order for science to 
progress, but these changes cannot happen in isolation; paradigm shifts must occur (to 
some extent) within the historical contexts of normal science – the science that 
chronologically preceded it. In the case of AD, it was discovered within the context of 
degenerative cognitive disorders, but it was a significantly new discovery. Without 
acknowledging science’s chronological development, the history of scientific 
advancement is lost. Historically, not only did the discovery of AD further advance the 
science of psychiatry, but it altered the scientific imagination in that it transformed the 
world of philosophy.  
IV. A Philosophical Connection Between AD and Personhood 
      In order to learn more about ourselves in relation to reality and the world within 
it, we often try to answer scientific questions. If we accept that philosophy and science 
exist together, and that they are not incongruous disciplines, then we can further analyze 
the philosophical implications of scientific discovery. From a philosophical perspective, 
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personhood can be broadly viewed, but for the purposes of this paper, I will only examine 
a post-modernist view, since Kuhn is a post-modernist philosopher. “Any attempt to 
define the meaning of the notion of the person opens a window to a vast horizon of 
inquiry that raises many additional questions on a variety levels” (Torchia xi). In relation 
to AD, the notion of personhood is inextricably linked. How could a person with AD 
understand the world around them if what he/she knew at one point is no longer relevant 
to their current experience? Does the fact that these people go through their own 
paradigmatic shifts and their “demented” perception in fact their new, and only valid, 
truth? Or is it that the disease simply taints their understanding of reality, and their 
perceptions of reality are wrong?  Perhaps these questions cannot be answered, but by 
using the notion of paradigm shifts as a way to explain the shift in our understanding of 
science and the world around us, it is fair to say that both the scientific and philosophical 
impacts of paradigm shifts are necessary for the growth of human understanding, 
potential, and personhood.  
There are different points along the continuum of embryological development at 
which different writers claim the definition of “personhood” (Irving 1). Before that 
biological point, the human embryo or human fetus is considered only an “object,” a 
“thing” which may be used or dealt with according to the personal desires of a human 
person.  After that particular biological marker event (conception, fertilization, birth, 
puberty, etc.) we suddenly have a human person, who is now considered a “subject” or an 
entity deserving protection against the interests, objectives, or desires of another human 
person (Irving 2). Therefore, the fundamental question underlying the notion of AD is 
when do these entities become undeserving of such protections, if at all? Does a person 
	   Ilg 16 
lose their personhood if their cognition (another biological marker) begins to deteriorate 
or fail? In order to better analyze these questions, one should turn to an analysis of 
consciousness because it distinguishes humans from other non-human animals. 
Although it is ambiguous as to what clearly constitutes a conscious experience, 
the underlying assumption among post-modernists, like Charles Taylor, is that “in the 
absence of self-consciousness (and, by extension, consciousness of others) one does not 
qualify as a member of the moral community” (Torchia 221). In this regard, “moral 
standing presupposes the social interaction of beings who enjoy rich inner life that allows 
them to enter a web of relationships carrying personal rights and generating 
corresponding duties to others” (Torchia 221). If this holds, then this is devastating to 
those with AD who cannot participate in social interactions or who cannot maintain 
responsibilities necessary to carry out personal duties. Postmodernist philosophers 
heavily emphasize overt characteristics as criteria of personhood (Torchia 223). 
“Postmodern assessments of personhood are ultimately based on how one is perceived by 
others in public forum, rather than on what one is by virtue of a nature, essence, or 
substantial form” (Torchia 223). Therefore, how individuals, and by extension, 
individuals with AD are perceived is the primary factor in determining their personhood.  
The postmodern distinction between humanity and personhood plays a role in 
many contemporary bioethical debates regarding end-of-life decisions and the right to life 
to those deprived of higher consciousness (Torchia 223), such as individuals with AD. 
“The loss of rational capacity, autonomy, and conscious experience presupposes a 
corresponding loss of moral agency and the personhood on which moral agency depends” 
(Torchia 223). However, there is a difference, I hold, between the human personal life 
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and the human biological life. In other words, because a person loses his or her mental 
faculties does not mean that he or she is less of a person, and yet, politically and socially 
there are many instances where those with AD are maltreated, discriminated against, and 
underrepresented. This reinforces the notion that those with degenerative cognitive 
disorders comes a loss of moral agency and positive regard by others.  
Therefore, the only solution is to promote scientific advancement and progress in 
order to enable those with AD to slow the rate of progression and continue to live 
competent lives. Here, a Kuhnian analysis would be essential. Once these discoveries are 
made (the current research being done as described in part II), then the paradigm could be 
reevaluated and tested. At this point, AD is in a state of normal science, after serving as a 
revolutionary shift within the field of psychiatry. If and when these discoveries are made, 
the paradigm may shift again. At this point, there is enough political inertia (eg. the 
“Walk to End Alzheimer’s” campaign) to encourage fundraising for such research. If we 
are to be a forward-thinking country in regards to scientific research, then the tension 
between science and philosophy (or more specifically, biomedical ethics) will continue to 
grow.  
V. Conclusion  
Given the scientific and philosophical problems inherent in the positions which 
argue for the various biological marker events of “personhood,” can we accept either the 
science that is used or the rationalistic or empiricist philosophical definitions of human 
beings versus human persons, which are incorporated into those arguments? Or is it even 
possible to reconcile the correct biological facts with a philosophical definition of a 
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human being or a human person? Assessing the discovery of AD from both philosophical 
and scientific frameworks raises the question, can philosophy and science truly coexist?  
Accepting the truism that progress occurs when one replaces a theory that solves 
more problems, Laudan (one of Kuhn’s biggest critics), in Progress and Its Problems, 
insists this truism is historically accurate only if the concept of “problem” is broadened 
beyond the empirical problem issues of traditional philosophers of science (70-90). If 
philosophical accounts of scientific progress are based solely on solved empirical 
problems, while anomalies and conceptual problems are not factored in, the picture of 
science that emerges fails to reflect the judgments of scientists about progress of their 
own disciplines. Despite weaknesses in Kuhn’s argumentation, applying a Kuhnian 
analysis to the history of AD is appropriate because he argued for an episodic model in 
which periods of conceptual continuity in normal science were interrupted by periods of 
revolutionary science, which includes the formal discovery of AD.  
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